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Abstract 
This article makes what Western scholars call a “leap in the dark” by suggesting that, instead 
of comparing the “West” with the “Rest”, we should compare the “East” with the “East”- in 
this case the media in China with the media in Russia. We have identified three blind spots in 
previous comparative media research that have resulted in turning attention away from 
comparative study of China and Russia. These are: (1) ahistoricism; (2) misunderstanding the 
relationship between the state and the market; and (3) understanding national media and 
communication as closed and homogenous systems. We propose three remedies: (1) 
historicizing comparative media studies
1
; (2) re-conceptualizing the relationship between the 
state and media markets; and (3) rethinking the dynamics between the global, the national 
and the media.   
      Keywords: Russia, China, comparative media research
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 We use ‘comparative media studies’ as a well-established term in communication research, but we also want to 
emphasize the role of communication.   
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A change of lens: A call to compare media in China and Russia 
      Comparative research was once called the “extended and extendable frontier” of the 
communication field (Blumler, et al., 1992, p. 2). From Four Theories of the Press (Siebert, 
et al., 1956) to Comparatively Speaking (Blumler, et al., 1992), to Comparing Media Systems 
(Hallin and Mancini, 2004), the frontier has indeed been extended. According to Hanitzsch 
(2008, pp. 113-114), the paradigm that underlies Four Theories is that of the “US” and the 
“rest”, which was superseded in the 1970s by the new, “second stage” paradigm of 
comparative research, that of the “North” and the “South”, with the recognition of uneven 
communication between different parts of the world and the introduction of the concept of 
media imperialism. The mid-1980s saw the emergence of a third paradigm, that of the 
“West” and the “West”, which has retained its vitality to date, as exemplified by some of the 
most important works in this field (e.g., Esser & Pfetsch, 2004; Hallin & Mancini, 2004). 
Hanitzch, (2008, p. 114) further suggests that a new paradigm is already being born, that of 
the “West” and the “Global”. While we salute this, we argue in this article that one paradigm 
is still missing, that of the “East” and the “East”2. Our aim is to justify this new paradigm, 
comparing what has not been compared before: media and communication in China and in 
Russia.  
      Although scholars have acknowledged the longstanding Western-centric orientation of 
comparative media research (e.g., Benson, 2010; Gunaratne, 2005; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; 
                                                 
2
 The East is used here metaphorically, as in “Go West, young man”, potentially opening up new opportunities. 
We are fully aware of the contended issues when using the “East”-“West” dichotomy. See, for example, 
Gunaratne, 2005, pp. 14-17. We are not arguing either that Russia, for example, has no European part. We are 
simply using the idea of the “East” to show that we still lack even the concepts we need for this kind of change 
or re-orientation of our research. 
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Hardt, 1988; Livingstone, 2003; Nerone, 1995; Oates, 2006; Sparks, 1998; Szpunar, 2012; 
Yin, 2008), aside from a few exceptions (Curran & Park, 2000; Downing, 1996; Gunaratne 
2005; Hallin & Mancini, 2012; Sparks, 1998, 2008), insufficient effort has been made to 
correct this orientation. This bias manifests itself at the empirical level in terms of which 
cases are selected for comparison, at the methodological level in terms of how comparisons 
are conducted, and at the theoretical level in terms of what conceptual frameworks are 
utilized. As Spivak (2009) points out in her reflection on comparative literature, comparison 
is “never a question of compare and contrast, but rather a matter of judging and choosing” (p. 
609). What to compare, and why, is always a critical decision that needs to be made in a 
reflexive manner. 
      Drawing attention to Russia and China is not a question of analysing two more cases 
within the existing frameworks, but will highlight the blind spots of the current research 
agenda and point to possible new directions. In the following we critically review previous 
theoretical work which we have found relevant to our argument that Chinese and Russian 
media should be compared, and go on to present empirical evidence (when available) to 
support our argument and to inform a future research agenda. We have identified biases in 
comparative research that will be redressed by means of three approaches to turning attention 
away from the West to look at these two “Eastern” countries. These approaches are: (1) 
historicizing comparative media studies from non-Western perspectives; (2) re-
conceptualizing the relationship between the state and media markets; and (3) rethinking the 
unit of comparison below and above the national level.   
Historicizing comparative media studies 
      In comparative research, units of analysis are compared across time and space. As 
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Blumler, McLeod and Rosengren write (1992), comparative research implies the 
interpenetration of space and time, i.e., comparing geographic systems almost as if they were 
frozen in time, presenting them more like snapshots than like moving films (pp. 7-8). The 
frozen moment, while enabling comparison across spatial boundaries, connotes the 
withdrawal of temporality; that is, social phenomena that should be explained as the outcome 
of a historical process have “now been transformed into the explanation’s premise” 
(Harootunian, 2005, p. 24). Many comparative studies end up privileging space over time in 
their failure to account for the historical experiences that produce the frozen moment. 
Harootunian contends that such insensitivity to the mediation of time has led to the 
“transmutation of space into a non-place, without duration and context” (p. 29).  
      We argue that, by bringing Russia and China into comparative research, we would 
reactivate the temporal dimension in communication studies, and would do so for two 
reasons. First, the historical trajectory of media and communication in Russia and China 
diverge so significantly from the familiar “norm” of Western Europe and North America that 
any analysis focusing exclusively on spatial differences is bound to be inadequate. Also, 
despite the historical parallels and direct connections between Russia and China in their 
Communist eras, the two countries have embarked in recent years on very different routes 
and cannot be easily lumped together with the label of “post-communist”, which again 
freezes dynamic processes into static moments.  
      So how do we account for the past in order to better understand the present? Here we 
make two propositions. First of all, to historicize comparative research means to understand 
the varied arrangements of media and communication in respective historical terms rather 
than as the spatial variations of a universal model. The most obvious historical legacy that 
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connects Russia and China while also separating them from the “norm” of Western liberal 
societies is a period of Communism they share (d). Not only are there conceptual and 
historical parallels between Russian and Chinese media and communication, but also the 
“Chinese Revolution grew directly out of the Russian Revolution, and remained connected 
with it, as inspiration or admonition, down to their common moment of truth at the end of the 
eighties” (Anderson, 2010, p. 60). But, just as democracy takes various forms in different 
Western countries, we also need to ask whether there is only one form of Communism, or for 
that matter only one Communist media system.    
       It is our contention that the Communist legacy needs not only to be acknowledged in the 
cases of both contemporary Russia and contemporary China, but also to be differentiated 
between the two countries. What were the similarities and differences between Russian and 
Chinese media during their Communist eras? How did Lenin’s conception that the Party 
press should play the roles of propagandist, agitator and organizer lay the foundations for the 
paradigm of Party journalism in China, which foregrounds the “Party principle” as the 
essential guideline for journalistic practice? (Zhao, 1998, p. 19; Zhao, 2011, p. 209). Apart 
from the influence of the Communist press theory in general, there was a period in 1950s 
China of direct imitation of the Soviet Union, when news agencies and broadcasting were 
modeled after the Soviet system (Rantanen, 2007, p. 171). However, as Ferdinand (1991) 
points out, the convergence of Communist regimes in the post-revolutionary era lasted for 
only a brief period, when communist parties in different countries were all striving to “secure 
the foundations of the regime through centralization of power and the establishment of public 
ownership of the means of production” (p. xi). After the first period of consolidation, the 
absence of any prescribed plan for socialist development compelled the Communist parties in 
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the Soviet Union and in China to re-examine the ideas and lessons drawn from their earlier 
paths to power, which were rather different in the two countries. Especially after the break in 
diplomatic relations in 1960, when the Soviet Union withdrew all its advisers from China, the 
two forms of Communism increasingly diverged (Ferdinand, 1991). This fact has often been 
ignored in Western comparative media research, where Soviet and Chinese media have been 
analysed with reference to a single concept of Communism.  
       Now the situation is even more complex: China is still nominally a Communist country, 
while Russia is not. In fact, in China the CCP has carefully studied the “velvet revolution” 
that took place in some countries of the former Soviet Bloc and has been making every effort 
to prevent China from moving in the same direction. Brady (2008) observes that Gorbachev’s 
reform and its outcome was a strong warning sign for the CCP. From the CCP’s point of 
view, the reforms in the former Soviet Union “succeeded in dismantling or weakening 
various aspects of the bureaucratic structure, the official ideology, and the active role of the 
Party in the economy, yet provided nothing to replace them” (Brady, 2008, p. 177). In 
contrast, the CCP’s strategy has been to maintain the ideological control and to a large extent 
the legitimacy of the Party through reshaping the economy. Exactly how the CCP was able to 
do this while the Communist Party in Russia was not is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
here again historicized comparison will shed important light on the issue, as Anderson (2010) 
demonstrates in his essay comparing the trajectories of the two revolutions. Anderson did not, 
however, give much attention to the role that the media and communication play in 
mobilizing, containing or constituting the changes, and this is a gap that comparative media 
research can surely be expected to fill. 
      The second proposition we make to historicize comparative media studies is to focus on 
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processes of changes rather than being fixated on a teleological view of history. As Downing 
(1996) points out, a major limitation of Western media theories is that they evolve from and 
are used to explain a relatively stable political economy. The relative stability of Western 
societies gives the illusion that they represent the historical endpoint towards which non-
Western countries are moving. Sparks (2008, 2010) uses the term transitology to refer to 
research that focuses on the transition of former authoritarian regimes towards the Western 
model of democracy. He calls this approach “a more sophisticated and scholarly version of 
the end of history” (Sparks, 2010, p. 558), since transitologists believe that, regardless of the 
history and characteristics of each authoritarian regime, the “twin process of democratic 
political change and the burgeoning of market economies” will lead transitional societies to 
the predetermined end of American-style democracy (Sparks, 2008, p. 9).  
      Russia and China defy the predictions of liberal teleology that all societies are 
progressing toward liberal capitalism, by taking two different routes away from the 
Communist era. While Russia started with political liberalization, which resulted in the 
Communist Party losing control, the Communist Party of China (CCP) has retained its 
political power and orchestrated the advancement of a “market economy with Chinese 
characteristics”. Russia is sometimes considered a democratic state, although qualifications 
such as “new” (Voltmer, 2008), “partial” (Potter et al., 1997), “illiberal” (Zakaria, 2003) 
“neo-authoritarian” (Becker, 2004) or “semi-authoritarian” (Toepfler, 2013) are often added 
before the word democracy.  
       At this historical conjuncture, the role of the media is more constitutive than 
instrumental. That is to say, media institutions are not only products or platforms of political 
struggles, they themselves actively take part in producing the dynamics of politics. In 
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countries where the hegemony of liberal democracy has become well established, we might 
be witnessing traditional ideological politics giving place to “the politics of trust” that is 
based on the specific policy package offered by different political parties (Thompson, 2005, 
p. 46). Hence mediated visibility is the key to the success of parties and politicians. Where 
the norm of media’s role in politics is heavily contested, however, media institutions may 
choose to build alliance with certain political forces by taking strategic position on the 
ideological spectrum. In Russia, as Burrett (2011, p. 216) writes, since 2000 President Putin 
has sought to increase state control over the national television, not merely as a means of 
influencing public opinion, but as a method of political domination over Russia’s elites. 
Some scholars have argued that in the 1990s the major national TV channels were playing 
more important role in democratic elections than political parties (Vartanova, 2012). We see 
this also in a stratified Chinese newspaper industry, where liberal-leaning newspapers like 
Southern Weekend (also known as Nanfang Weekend) are aligning themselves not only with 
the liberal faction of the Party but also with transnational elites in order to “play an 
increasingly important role in Chinese domestic politics” (Zhao & Xing, 2012, p.31). This is 
why Roudakova (2012) calls for a process-oriented comparative research which is more 
attuned to recognizing the indeterminacy of social changes. According to Roudakova (2012), 
a process-oriented approach would be more sensitive to both order-maintaining and order-
eroding changes that are particularly useful in theorizing hybrid regimes. We would like to 
add that this could also be an effective approach to historicize comparative research, as it 
does not start with a prescription for the direction of change.  
      Overall, the history of media and communication in both Russia and China needs to be 
acknowledged not merely as a relevant past, but as a powerful context that shapes the present. 
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We simply cannot make conclusions based on one frozen moment, on the present without the 
past; any comparative study has to be historically contextualized, taking into account the 
similarities and differences in each historical period, and not labelling these periods simply as 
communism or post-communism, as if they were/are similar everywhere. Further, by 
focusing on frozen present moment, comparative research implies that the pace of change is 
similar everywhere, and thus the present becomes the future. This further increases the 
orientation towards the future, towards how things should be rather than how they are. As a 
consequence, there is no understanding that social and political change moves at different 
paces and not always forwards. 
Re-conceptualizing the relationship between the state and the market 
       Benson (2010) points out that one crucial question that comparative research has so far 
failed to address is “the extent to which even an ‘expanding’ understanding of Western media 
(beyond the American paradigm) is adequate to fully account for the wide variety of media 
found in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe” (p. 615). Hallin and Mancini 
(2004), for example, develop a critical appraisal of the media in North Atlantic countries and 
point out the incoherence of the “Anglo-American”. Yet, as the authors themselves are 
aware, since their analytical framework is tied to their eighteen empirical cases drawn 
exclusively from the West, the basic concepts need to be re-examined in order to apply them 
to other cases (Hallin and Mancini, 2012). The four elements—media market, political 
parallelism, professionalism and state intervention—are identified as distinctive variables that 
affect the freedom and autonomy of the media. The assumption is that the degree of state 
intervention and political parallelism is negatively correlated with the level of media 
autonomy, while the development of media markets and professionalism has a positive 
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correlation with media freedom.  
      When it comes to studying the arrangement of media and communication in countries like 
China and Russia, however, it is the interdependence of the market and the state that is more 
important. First, the state needs a robust media market. In China, media marketization is a 
state-orchestrated project that was designed to reinforce rather than to undermine the 
legitimacy of the Party-state. When the economic reform of media started in the late 1970s 
right after the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese state was facing severe financial and political 
challenges. Through introducing commercialized financing and encouraging profit making of 
media organizations, the government was able to gradually shed off the significant fiscal 
burden of media subsidies. Politically, media commercialization was part and parcel of the 
overall economic reform, which was deemed by the CCP as the only way forward to retain its 
legitimacy. It was no coincidence that media marketization in China further accelerated under 
the government mandate in the early 1990s (Chan, 1993), when the Party-state again was 
trying to survive a legitimacy crisis in the aftermath of 1989 student movement and the 
economic stagnation of the 1980s. In this second wave of intensified marketization, both 
newspaper and broadcasting industries were encouraged to form consolidated media groups. 
It was expected that the more concentrated media structure would not only rationalize the 
allocation of communication resource and improve market efficiency, but also make it easier 
for the Party to exert centralized control (Zhao, 1998). Indeed, as scholars have pointed out, 
marketization has strengthened the power of the Party-state’s propaganda machine by 
creating financially viable “Party Publicity Inc.”(Lee, et.al, 2006). 
      In Russia and in China television is primarily owned by the state, but its revenues are 
dependent on advertising by private companies. The state needs the market, and cannot 
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maintain its ownership without private revenues. The state also has its own extensive media 
holdings and state news agencies have not changed their ownership structures (Becker, 2004; 
Rantanen & Vartanova, 1995). Further, as Vartanova (2012) observes, neither the Russian 
state nor the Russian public have supported clear and transparent rules for the media, as they 
have for other political and social institutions. However, Vartanova (2012, pp. 132-134) is 
able to identify three different stages in post-Soviet state-media relations, in each of which 
the state has played a different role. We can clearly see that it is not only the media that have 
changed, but the state as well. In Russia, all major television networks have come under the 
ownership of the state or industrial groups with close economic ties to the presidential 
administration (Burrett, 2011).  
      Second, when marketization took place in countries where the state used to control all the 
media outlets, the allocation of communication resource was the combined function of 
political power and market force. In other words, it is not about less or more state 
intervention to the extant media market. Rather, the market was only set up within the 
parameters determined by the state and the mechanism of state control evolves as media 
marketization develops.  
       In the case of China, it is almost impossible to talk about the state and the political party 
separately, and the role of the Party-state in the organization and regulation of the media is 
far more pervasive than “intervention” (Zhao, 2012). Over the years, the CCP has developed 
a sophisticated control mechanism, which is still evolving as both global and domestic media 
landscapes continue to change. The power of the Party-state is exercised at multiple levels. 
First and foremost it is direct political control of the orientation, resources and personnel of 
media production. In addition to general guidelines requiring the cultural industries to 
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contribute to “developing socialist advanced culture” and “maintaining a harmonious 
society”, directives addressing specific issues are frequently issued by the Party’s Department 
of Publicity and relevant state ministries. Control of the recruitment, promotion and firing of 
personnel is another effective means by which the Party deploys its disciplinary power (Zhao, 
2008, pp. 28-30).  
      In Russia, following the period of disintegration of both the Russian state and the media 
system in the 1990s, the state has been able to reconsolidate its power since the start of the 
new millennium through “centralization, standardization of structure and selective isolation 
from global influence” (Koltsova, 2008, p. 62). Aside from direct state control, private media 
companies appoint top managers who meet with the approval of the state authorities. 
Vartanova (2012) calls the present Russian media model a commercialized statist model in 
which there is a strong relationship between the media, journalists and the state, legitimized 
by a shared belief in the decision-making role of the state (or of state agencies). 
      What also need to be emphasized are the important differences between the 
commercialized statist model of media in the two countries, due to the historical divergence 
mentioned in the previous section. Compared with the ruling party in Russia, the CCP still 
has not resolved the tension between operating a capitalist economy yet still calling itself 
Communist. Although recent leadership has resorted to rhetoric ranging from ‘harmonious 
society’ to ‘Chinese dream’ to circumvent the ideological contradiction, the party cannot turn 
its back against the socialist and revolutionary legacy, which is bound to disrupt any perfect 
alliance between the political and business elites.   
      Overall, the misunderstanding of the relationship between the state and the markets seems 
to be an Achilles heel of comparative studies so far undertaken by Western researchers in 
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media and communication studies. This is the point whereas normative assumptions about an 
ideal situation masquerade as a depiction of how things actually are. In fact, the assumed 
antagonistic relationship between the market and the state is so deeply rooted in Western 
thinking that it not only overshadows any analysis comparing the “West” with the “East”, but 
also results in bias in understanding Western media themselves, as many scholars of critical 
political economy have pointed out the instrumental role that the state takes in expanding the 
private interest of media companies (e.g. Curran, 1977; Calabrese & Briziarelli, 2011). Hence 
shifting our focus to countries like China and Russia offers an opportunity to better 
understand not only what the “West” views as the Other, but also the “West” itself.   
Rethinking the dynamics between the global, the national and the local 
        In most comparative studies, the nation-state is taken for granted as the starting point of 
analysis, which explains why the label “cross-national” is sometimes synonymous with 
comparative research (Livingstone, 2003). Beck (2005) criticizes the methodological 
nationalism in social theory for impeding our understanding of important phenomena that are 
not bounded by the arbitrary context of the nation-state. In media and communication 
research, from Four Theories of the Press to Comparing Media Systems, taking the nation-
state as the default analytical unit results in losing sight of developments below and above the 
national level. Although this is not always made explicit, comparing media systems mostly 
implies that (1) the media within a national boundary are largely homogeneous; (2) the media 
are defined in national terms, even if we can see various combinations of the local, national 
and global media inside one country. It also tends to concentrate on the old media and media 
institutions often ignoring non-institutional forms of communication from below (e.g., 
Rantanen, 2005, Rantanen, 2013). We contend here that, by examining the cases of Russia 
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and China, we can see more clearly that media systems and nation-states do not always go 
hand in hand, that media systems are not completely determined by national political systems 
and that all forms of communication are not systematized. 
      First, Russia and China are both vast countries where spatial and temporal differences 
within national boundaries should not be ignored. Even though both countries have a statist 
tradition of centralizing control over the media, especially during the Communist era, neither 
time nor space are fully controlled. As Harootunian (2005) reminds us, there always exist 
“simultaneously differing forms of temporalization within a single space, despite the nation-
states’ effort to obliterate them” (p. 25). In China, the modernization project has been an 
uneven process across the urban and the rural, the coastal areas and the hinterland. Media 
ecology in a global metropolis such as Beijing, Shanghai or Guangzhou is very different from 
that in second-tier cities in the hinterland. In calling for a geographic turn in Chinese media 
research, Sun (2010) also highlights the reconfigured scales of media production, 
consumption, representation and regulation as the result of uneven modernization. Given “the 
dramatic disparities between north and south, east and west, coast and inland, and finally, but 
most importantly, rural and urban” (Sun, 2010, p. 540), it is increasingly difficult and 
deceptive to talk about a single national media system. Ma (2001) uses the concept of 
“satellite modernities” to refer to the sites that mediate between global networks and 
developing localities. Well-connected global cities like Shanghai and Hong Kong are 
“reproducing, hybridizing and domesticating simplified imaginations of the developed West, 
which less developed cities and territories in the same regions also consume” (Ma, 2012, 
p.291). From this perspective, cities or regions may be more productive sites of analysis than 
the nation-state.   
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      Koltsova (2008) critiques the dominant notion of the nation-state in media and 
communication studies that presupposes “the coincidence of the territorial, political, ethnic, 
and cultural boundaries of the entity they seek to describe” (p. 53), which is a predominantly 
Western European phenomenon. Such a narrow understanding cannot account for the cultural 
and ethnic complexity in many non-Western countries. Vartanova (2009, p. 110) observes 
that Russia’s present “media system” is very different from the pyramid model of the Soviet 
period. With the emergence of regional and local markets, the horizontal structure of the 
Soviet media system has been partly replaced by a more vertical structure. In Russia, 
television is still the main national medium reaching most of the population, no matter where 
they are located, but there is no longer a national press. There is also a huge discrepancy 
between the big cities and the countryside in terms of access to media and communications. 
One could even argue that both Russia and China are too large to have a single media system, 
but actually have many, or sometimes no system at all.   
       Second, nation-based comparative analysis is further called into question when we take 
into account the negotiation between local, national and global forces in configuring media 
production and consumption. From the global popularity of reality TV (Waisbord, 2004) to 
the increasingly transnational production of Hollywood (Miller et al, 2005), the ways in 
which media production and distribution are organized are less and less confined within 
national boundaries. Erni and Chua (2005) raised the intriguing question of how the whole 
idea of “domestic media” is challenged, “when local media producers themselves have 
actively sought to emulate, and sometimes create, ‘culturally pirated versions’ of western 
production codes and programming?” (p. 2). The Chinese film industry is an example of this 
phenomenon. Ever since China, in the late 1990s, re-opened its film market to first-run 
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Hollywood movies on a revenue-sharing basis, Hollywood has become the model of 
successful film making that the domestic film industry tries to emulate. Typical Hollywood 
strategies, from aggressive marketing campaigns to the pursuit of visual spectacles, from 
cross-promotion to product placement (Wasko, 2003), have been adopted by Chinese film-
makers. Needless to say, the adaptation of the Hollywood model by the Chinese film industry 
is mediated by other key factors such as state and local audiences, but if we confine our 
analysis to the nation-state, we miss a significant dimension of power that shapes the media 
landscape. 
      On the other hand, during different historical periods, “domestic” media in China and 
Russia developed global outlook and ambition that went beyond national boundaries. We 
need to remember that both Russia and China have an obvious advantage in their size and 
thus a huge domestic media market that supports a middle path between export reliance and 
import substitution (Lin, 2006, p. 263). The Soviet Union was a formidable exporter of films, 
of television and radio programmes to former Communist countries, itself practicing a 
version of media or cultural imperialism—not through the ownership of media, but through 
its political presence in other communist countries. After the collapse of the state-owned 
media system there was a period of decline in film and TV programme production, but today 
the Russian film and TV industry has again become a significant player (Rantanen, 2002, pp. 
86-87). While US-produced films still dominate the Russian market, the market share of 
domestically produced films has increased significantly. As Vartanova (2009) observes, 
today Moscow’s media executives have more in common with their counterparts in London, 
Paris and New York than with similarly titled executives in Russia’s outer provinces (p. 98).  
      Taking into account the size of Russia and China and their integration into global 
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capitalism, we face a situation where many earlier theories, such as those of media 
imperialism and de-colonialism, that start with methodological nationalism do not catch the 
complexity of the relationship between the local, the national and the global. As Erni and 
Chua (2005) point out, “a general situation has existed in the field for over four decades, 
whereby western methodologies and epistemologies have been largely accepted as guiding 
lights and “the local” was accepted as the recipient or the context of their glow”(p. 2). 
However, more often than not, the guiding light only illuminates very limited areas, while 
leaving in darkness much of China and Russia. 
      Digital media further calls into question the validity of nation-based analysis. In contrast 
to China, the Internet in Russia is currently not being systematically filtered. Many consider 
Russia as a relatively closed regime that pursues an open Internet policy (Toepfl, 2013; 
Oates, 2013; Etling, et al, 2010). While Putin was able to put through a series of measures 
that tightened the control of political censorship over the mass media, and in particular over 
television (Koltsova 2006), the Internet has so far remained officially uncensored. Therefore 
compared with China, Russia perhaps has more political space for activism, and Internet 
activism in Russia is probably more connected with social movements in other parts of the 
world (Yang, 2014). In China, however, the Internet is a vibrant domestic communicative 
space despite heavy censorship. The considerable difference between political discussions 
online and that in mainstream traditional media, as well as the highly contested and at times 
fragmented nature of online discourses themselves further challenge a national understanding 
of a “media system”.  
Conclusion 
       In this article, we have argued that the biases propagated by previous comparative media 
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studies have dominated research since World War II and prevented us from taking account of 
significant changes in Russia and China. We have critically reviewed previous studies and 
suggested a radical departure from the previous models used in comparative studies. Not only 
are we calling for better historically contextualized understanding of two largest countries in 
the world per se, we also believe that they offer unique opportunities to reflect on limitations 
of the dominant framework in comparative research. The change in geography does not as 
such change our thinking if we do not simultaneously open it to different sets of new 
concepts. While extending the geographical scope (“going East”) of our research, we need to 
remove the spectacles we wear when carrying out research on Western media. Continuing to 
wear these spectacles tends to result in using an idealized Western model to measure the past 
and present of countries outside the “West”. In this article, we have critically reviewed earlier 
concepts and theories applied to comparative research in general and question their 
applicability when new avenues of research are opened. Indeed, there is no point to add new 
countries to the list if it only means applying the same concepts trying to force empirical 
materials support them. 
       We have identified three major limitations of the dominant framework that a China-
Russia comparison could help redressing. First of all, our emphasis on historicizing 
comparative research goes beyond calling for historical analysis only. Contemporary media 
and communication landscape of Russia and China needs to be studied within their respective 
historical context. As much as we tend to take “frozen moments” for the convenience of 
comparison, the present can never be severed from either the past or the future. It is our 
proposition that on the one hand, we need to compare and contrast the relevancy of key 
historical legacies such as communism and statism in Russia and China. On the other hand, 
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we should be wary of the teleological view that assumes whatever the divergence is at the 
moment, the two countries are transitioning toward the same historical end point. Ong (2011, 
p. 11) uses the concept of worlding to identify the projects and practices that “instantiate 
some vision of the world in formation” (see also Spivak, 1999). On the most general level, 
this is one of the key issues in our article. By picking two countries that do not fit in with the 
existing model, we hope to activate a view of history that foregrounds changes and processes.  
       Our second point is narrower, that comparing Russia and China would help re-
conceptualizing the relationship between state and market in shaping the institutional 
arrangement of media. We point to evidence that indicates the power of the state as well as 
interdependence between state and market in both countries. Such re-conceptualization not 
only sheds light on media in other non-Western countries, but also reveals the serious 
limitation of the dominant framework, which takes for granted an antithetical relationship 
between state and market, even in explaining media in Western liberal countries. The third 
issue that we examined has to do with the validity of a systematic view of media and the 
analytical units for comparison. Once we acknowledge the stratification of media and 
communication below the national level, especially in large and diverse countries like Russia 
and China, we cannot help wondering if smaller units such as a city or a region are needed 
when conducting comparative research. In the meantime, both media institutions and 
communication activities are spilling over national boundary to interact with supranational or 
global forces, which again point to the problem with only comparing national media systems.  
       We are fully aware that this article is only the starting point for a new research agenda. 
We have raised more questions than we can adequately address in one single article. So why 
do we need what Sassen (2009) calls “digging in the shadows cast by blinding illumination of 
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canonical works and master categories” (p. 115)? One of the reasons for the general 
reluctance of academics to go beyond the comfort zones of their own expertise, derived from 
their ‘own’ countries, is that comparative research is conducted to a considerable extent as if 
“out of (one’s own familiar) bounds”—or at least “across bounds”, or involving a “leap in the 
dark”, into the relatively unknown (Blumler et al., 1992, pp. 7-8). A profound qualitative 
analysis requires the researcher to be, at least to a certain extent, an expert on every country 
involved. To study countries without any previous knowledge of them and claim that 
studying more than one country at a time somehow internationalizes one’s research raises an 
important issue about the de-colonization of academia. Shome (2009, pp. 714-716) makes an 
important comment on de-Eurocentrism and de-Westernization. According to her, neither of 
these necessarily translates into decolonization of knowledge, politics or imagination.  
       In our view, de-Eurocentrism and de-Westernization are not enough, but we also need to 
decolonize communication research by making comparisons between non-Western countries 
as legitimate as comparisons between the “West” and the “Rest” currently are.  This would 
mean that comparisons between countries like Russia and China would no longer be 
considered “leaps in the dark” or “digging in the shadows”, but would have the place they 
deserve in comparative communication studies. More than this, concepts and theories can 
surely be open enough to allow us to carry out research with open eyes instead of wearing 
spectacles that only magnify what is near. The world is changing, and comparative research 
needs to become more cosmopolitan before it again fails to see the changes taking place in 
the world.  
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